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1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has represented an unprecedented shock to the Irish and
global economies. Its impact has been acutely felt by the Small and Medium Enter-
prise (SME) sector. SMEs account for 99 per cent of businesses in Ireland and 68
per cent of private sector employment.1 Many of these firms have had to close peri-
odically due to public health restrictions and/or deal with a major drop in demand.
Previous research for Ireland has highlighted very serious losses, with estimates that
up to one-in-two firms faced a revenue shortfall during the first three months of the
pandemic (2020 Q2) and that one-in-six SMEs may have been financially distressed
at end-2020 (Lawless et al., 2020a; Lambert et al., 2020).
COVID-19 is a global shock, with numerous studies similar in spirit to our own
emerging globally. Most of these studies highlight major falls in turnover and em-
ployment (Apedo Amah et al., 2020; Bartlett & Morse, 2020; Chetty et al., 2020),
widescale and intermittent closures (Bartik et al., 2020), increased failure risks
(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2020) and lower productivity levels (Bloom et al., 2020).
These studies highlight major uncertainties around future demand and recovery,
with evidence from the US suggesting that firms expect demand to remain over 30
per cent lower than normal on an ongoing basis (Balla-Elliott et al., 2020).
To deal with the economic fallout from the pandemic, a range of policy mea-
sures have been introduced. Across the globe, over 1,600 instruments have been
introduced across 135 countries (Cirera et al., 2020). These are mainly debt-based
policies, employment cost supports and tax measures. In Ireland, an extensive set of
policies has also been introduced focusing on wage subsidisation, tax and payment
deferrals, grants and direct cost supports as well as lending facilities.
Despite the existing research and extensive policy response, a number of data
gaps exist in the Irish context. Such gaps are problematic in building a thorough ev-
idence base for the development and targeting of policies as well as an understanding
of the channels impacting firms. These data gaps are as follows: 1) a quantification
of the up-to-date position of Irish SMEs in terms of operating activities, assets and
indebtedness just prior to the pandemic which could be combined with pandemic
impact data; 2) no detailed information on expenditure and costs2; and 3) updated
information on the usage of policy measures, which could be combined with data on
the real economy impact of the pandemic.
1We divide firms into four size groups: the self-employed, other micro firms (employing between
2 and 9 people), small firms (with 10 to 49 employees) and medium firms (with 50 to 249 employees).
2Some high level information is available from a series of CSO surveys on the busi-
ness impact of COVID-19: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-covid19/covid-
19informationhub/economy/businessimpactofcovid-19survey/
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To bridge these gaps, we use new survey data that were collected as part of the
Department of Finance Credit Demand Survey series. The survey was extensively
redesigned in light of COVID-19 to capture information on SME performance prior
to the pandemic and to provide information on its impact on turnover, expenditure
and profits with reference to the time period from from March to October 2020. It
also included a range of questions on firm usage of selected policy supports. Our
research builds on recent papers in this space (Lambert et al., 2020; Lawless et al.,
2020a; McGeever et al., 2020a) and provides the most detailed analysis to date for
Ireland of SMEs before and after the pandemic began.
A number of important findings emerge. First, considering the pre-pandemic
baseline, we document firms’ cost structure, liquidity and indebtedness. We show
that the median SME had cash on hand sufficient to cover 3 weeks of 2019 levels of
total expenditure, or 31 weeks of fixed cost expenditures. As noted in other studies
(McQuinn & McCann, 2017) Irish SMEs had relatively low levels of indebtedness
and leverage in the years preceding the pandemic, suggesting that SME balance
sheets were unlikely to be an amplifier of pandemic-related economic stress.3
Second, the results reveal the uneven impact of the pandemic across sectors:
while the median fall in turnover was just over 25 per cent, firms in hotels and
restaurants noted a median decline of 65 percent. Across other sectors, the whole-
sale trade sector and business services were amongst the least impacted, although
the median reduction in output is still substantial. Similar to other international
research (Cirera et al., 2020), the decline in turnover was largest for self-employed
enterprises.
A key finding, previously unexplored in this area, relates to the extent that firms
were able to absorb the turnover shock by adjusting expenditures. We find that 40
per cent of firms reduced expenditure with an average reduction of 8.5 percent. We
estimate that a one euro decline in revenue is associated with a 0.36 euro decline in
expenditure, suggesting that firms in the main have not had sufficient cost reduction
capacity to eradicate the effect of the pandemic on profit margins.
The data show that operating losses were widespread with an average of 9 per
cent losses during the pandemic (as compared to profit margins of 24 per cent in
2019). Of note, there is no evidence of a link between firm profitability in 2019 and
how they fared in 2020 highlighting the exogenous nature of the shock.
Measuring SMEs’ usage of support schemes, the main instruments used, during
the period in which the survey covered (April to September 2020), have been tax
warehousing or deferred tax payments, wage subsidies through the Temporary Wage
Subsidy Scheme (and the follow up Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme), grants and
340 per cent of SMEs had no debt in 2019, with the median indebted SME having a debt to
assets ratio of just 12 per cent.
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fixed cost supports as well as lending facilitation measures. At the time of writing it
appears that public health restrictions are going to persist for a longer period than
envisaged in summer 2020. Given this context, it is important to continue to provide
firms, who are closed due to the regulations, with sufficient support to survive this
current period.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides an overview
of the cost and financial position of firms before the pandemic. Section 3 considers
the impact of the pandemic on turnover, employment, expenditure and profitability.
Section 4 assess the policy response and section 5 concludes.
2 Cost structure and financial vulnerability be-
fore the pandemic
SMEs are the predominant enterprise type in Ireland, accounting for 99 per cent
of active businesses, with 92 per cent of these being “Micro”, i.e. having less than
10 employees. In total SMEs account for 68 per cent of private sector employment,
highlighting their central importance to overall economic activity. Economies of
scale imply that larger firms are typically more productive: despite accounting for
almost all active enterprises, SMEs account for 46 per cent of private sector turnover
and only 37 per cent of gross value added (with the remainder owing to large enter-
prises of over 250 employees, many of whom are Multi-National Enterprises, MNEs).
Despite Ireland’s reputation as a high-tech, knowledge intensive exporting econ-
omy, the majority of employees in Ireland work in traditional, domestic-facing sectors
where SMEs are the dominant employer. Eurostat data show that Ireland had the
highest share of employment in the “High Tech Manufacturing” (2.8 per cent) and
“High-Tech Knowledge-Intensive Services” (5.3 per cent) among all EU countries in
2018.4 By comparison, 43 per cent of private employees work in the Motor, Whole-
sale, Retail, Transport, Storage, Accommodation and Food sectors, with another 9
per cent in Construction.5 As a measure of economy-wide vulnerability to the di-
rect effects of the pandemic, Ireland’s employment structure has certain fragilities,
with higher levels of pre-pandemic total employment relative to EU averages in the
Accommodation and Food (13 versus 8 per cent) and Wholesale and Retail sectors
4https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/3/3c/Employment in high-
tech sectors%2C EU-28 and selected countries%2C 2018.png
5See https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-bii/businessinireland2018/detailedbusinesssectors/.
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(25 versus 23 per cent).6
SMEs in Ireland entered the COVID-19 pandemic in relatively good financial
health. The decade since the global financial crisis in Ireland was characterised
by substantial deleveraging across the SME sector. In aggregate, between Decem-
ber 2010 and December 2019 the outstanding stock of credit to SMEs outside the
property and financial sectors fell by 47 per cent, from e27bn to e14bn. The
composition of aggregate credit to enterprises has also changed dramatically, with
less focus on property-related borrowing across the business sector (see McCann &
McIndoe-Calder (2014) for details of the scale of this activity among SMEs whose
main activity did not relate to property during the last crisis). Since the economic
recovery began in 2013, Irish SMEs have had lower levels of credit applications than
SMEs across Europe, citing the desire to utilize internal funds as their main financ-
ing source for investment.7 Indeed, internal funds holdings have been shown to be
higher in Ireland than in other countries in recent years (Lawless et al., 2020b).
The share of firms reporting zero debt balances rose steadily since 2013, while the
share of highly indebted firms (those with debt greater than turnover) fell over the
same horizon (McQuinn & McCann, 2017). These patterns are likely caused by a
number of factors, including risk aversion owing to the scarring experience of many
over-indebted businesses during the last crisis, a survivorship bias where many of the
highest-risk firms were liquidated after the last crisis, the higher cost of borrowing
in Ireland, among others.
We now highlight a number of new insights on pre-pandemic starting points
from the 2020 version of the SME Credit Demand Survey (CDS). In Table 1, we
provide for the first time to our knowledge a breakdown of the cost structure of
Irish businesses. The 2020 version of the CDS included detailed questions on the
share of eight different expenditure items: purchases, wages, taxes, utilities, rent,
loan repayments, commercial rates, and a miscellaneous category. We split these
costs into Variable Costs (purchases, wages, taxes), Fixed Costs (utilities, rent, loan
repayments, commercial rates), and Miscellaneous. Gaining an understanding of
the ex-ante cost structure of SMEs allows us to deepen our assessment of the likely
survival prospects and solvency positions of SMEs today, given that the businesses
most likely to end up in a non-viable situation are those with fixed costs that were
6Comparison to EU average sectoral employment shares using Eurostat’s Annual enterprise
statistics for special aggregates of activities (NACE Rev. 2) [SBS NA SCA R2].
7This pattern has been prevalent in each of the Central Bank of Ireland’s SME Market Reports
in recent years: https://www.centralbank.ie/publication/sme-market-reports.
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larger than their revenues during the most acute phase of the pandemic.
Table 1: SME’s expenditure structure in 2019
Variable costs Fixed costs
Purch. Wages Taxes All Util. Rent Debt Com. All Misc.
Manufacturing 47 28 5 81 5 2 1 2 10 9
Construction 38 36 7 81 4 1 2 2 9 10
Wholesale 52 24 6 82 4 3 2 2 11 7
Hotels & restaurants 29 37 7 73 7 4 2 3 16 11
Business services 23 46 8 76 5 4 1 2 12 12
Other 28 45 4 77 5 2 1 1 10 13
Self-employed 44 22 9 75 7 5 2 2 15 9
Micro 37 34 7 79 5 4 2 2 13 9
Small 36 38 6 80 5 2 2 2 11 9
Medium 37 37 4 78 4 2 1 1 9 13
Total 37 35 6 79 5 3 2 2 11 10
Means of item’s share in total expenditures. Purch.=purchases of goods and services, Com.=
commercial rates.
In total, we highlight that on average 79 per cent of expenditures in 2019 were
Variable, and 11 per cent were Fixed. This cost structure suggests that SMEs
had significant scope to adjust costs downward in response to the adverse revenue
shocks that hit in March 2020. Firstly, certain purchases should mechanically adjust
downwards with businesses demand, as businesses slow their own purchases of raw
materials and goods for resale in response to a lack of prospective sales. However,
in practice, it is unlikely that businesses were able to achieve one-for-one reductions
in purchase costs given the uncertainty that has prevailed during the pandemic
about the future path for sales. Furthermore, the incidence of purchases on trade
credit combined with the sheer speed of the shock in March 2020 meant that across
the economy, over ten billion euro worth of inputs may have been purchased by
firms who faced rapid closure due to public health restrictions and therefore may
not have received the expected revenue required to repay (McCann & Myers, 2020).8
8Key representative groups were corroborating the risk that variable costs may have arisen
before SMEs were able to anticipate the shock to their demand. For example, quoting IBEC
chief economist Gerard Brady, the Irish Times reported the following in April 2020: “For many
businesses orders which were fulfilled in the opening quarter of the year have not been paid for,
expensive stock is left sitting on the shelves, and payment timelines are stretched. As a result, the
need for liquidity has greatly increased.”
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Wages comprise on average 35 per cent of business expenditures. The income
supports in place since March 2020 means that this is a very important cost item
that has largely been mitigated for SMEs experiencing turnover shocks, through the
possibility of either laying workers off who then receive the PUP, or maintaining
staff but having a substantial portion of wages covered through the TWSS/EWSS.
The fact that Fixed Costs represent on average only 10 per cent of total expen-
ditures means that for many businesses, such costs likely can be met through grants
such as the re-start grant and CRSS, and cash holdings and borrowing. Looking
across sectors, there is important variation: Hotels and restaurants had on average
the highest share of Fixed Costs in total expenditure at 16 per cent on average, high-
lighting another ex-ante vulnerability that will have made it more difficult to absorb
the pandemic revenue shock. Similarly, looking across firm sizes, self-employed busi-
nesses had the highest share of Fixed Costs at 15 per cent, compared to 9 per cent
for Medium-sized firms.
We now turn our attention to measures of ex-ante vulnerability that had the
potential to exacerbate the effects of an unexpected shock such as the COVID-19
pandemic. Given that the COVID-19 shock has been in the first instance an acute
liquidity crisis for businesses, in Table 2 we focus on the liquidity position of SMEs,
measuring cash holdings across sectors and firm size groups. We report four mea-
sures: cash amounts, the cash to total assets ratio, cash to total expenses, and cash
to fixed costs. The final row in the table provides statistics across the entire sample.
SMEs held on average e930,000 of cash balances in 2019, however this masks a
significant skewness across firms: one half of SMEs held only e45,000 or less. Cash
was on average 24 per cent of total assets for Irish SMEs in 2019, and 15 per cent
at the median.
Perhaps the most relevant liquidity metrics for firms’ survival to withstand the
pandemic shock related to their capacity to cover expenses. SMEs had on average
cash balances to cover 15 weeks of total expenditure. However, when focussing only
on fixed costs, we see that the liquidity position of SMEs appears much more robust:
SMEs had on average 161 weeks’ worth of fixed costs in cash, or 31 weeks at the
median. Interestingly, when measuring cash to expenses or cash to fixed costs, the
liquidity position of SMEs is similar across sectors and firm size groups. One notable
outlier is the Hotels & restaurants sector, in which half of SMEs had cash to cover
only 18 weeks of fixed costs, or less (versus a median of 31 weeks across the SME
population).
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Table 2: Cash and cash equivalent assets in 2019: Levels and ratios
in 1000 EUR Cash/Assets Cash/Expenses∗ Cash/Fixed∗
Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med.
Manufacturing 413 60 17 10 11 3 139 30
Construction 296 38 23 15 7 2 143 24
Wholesale 957 40 20 10 12 3 185 33
Hotels & restaurants 805 50 14 10 20 3 119 18
Business services 817 50 36 25 20 5 179 46
Other 2102 50 26 10 20 4 127 27
Self-employed 12 1 19 5 16 1 141 23
Micro 653 15 24 10 17 2 177 27
Small 822 100 25 15 12 3 173 29
Medium 1918 310 23 15 17 4 127 41
Total 930 45 24 15 15 3 161 31
∗ Average weekly total expenditures, average weekly fixed-cost expenditures
Table 3 looks at debt and leverage at the onset of the pandemic. Our data tell
us that 61 per cent of SMEs have debt, which is e1.3m on average and e200,000
at the median. Leverage, as measured by the debt to assets ratio, is on average 53
per cent (or 19 per cent on the basis of debt-to-turnover, a measure incorporating
ability to repay), with half of SMEs having leverage ratios of 12 per cent or lower
(4 per cent or lower for debt-to-turnover). McCann & McIndoe-Calder (2012) have
previously show that the average leverage ratio in a 2010 sample of Irish SMEs was
72 per cent, suggesting a marked reduction since the last crisis. Further, they show
a strong non-linearity in the effect of leverage on SME default, with loans in the
bottom half of the loan size to assets ratio distribution having similar defaults that
are half the size of default rates in the top decile of this measure of leverage. These
metrics suggest that overall the sector did not enter the pandemic with high ex-ante
levels of credit-driven vulnerability. There is a sectoral dispersion, with leverage
ratios on average 65 per cent in the Wholesale & Retail sectors and 60 per cent
in the Hotels & restaurants sector (32 per cent for debt-to-turnover, well above all
other sectors), which, all other things equal, heightens the risk of insolvency and
leaves less scope to borrow to adjust to the revenue shocks experienced in 2020.
Overall the data tell a story of relatively resilient SME finances, with low levels of
indebtedness across the SME population at the onset of the pandemic. While cash
balances are low for many SMEs, they nonetheless represented over half a year’s
worth of fixed costs or more for the majority of SMEs.
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Table 3: Debt and assets in 2019
Debt Assets Debt/assets Debt/turn.
ShareD>0 Mean
∗ Med.∗ Mean∗ Med.∗ Mean Med. Mean Med.
Manufacturing 69 1121 375 3624 1500 34 14 16 7
Construction 64 1090 175 1912 400 51 16 13 3
Wholesale 65 1087 175 3378 600 65 13 19 4
Hotels & restaurants 63 2423 600 6916 1300 60 16 32 7
Business services 54 1027 70 2090 200 58 6 17 2
Other 56 2099 250 18478 1000 27 4 17 1
Self-employed 44 53 10 134 50 29 0 20 0
Micro 59 274 50 943 175 56 8 17 3
Small 64 1101 300 2852 1000 55 13 17 4
Medium 70 3390 1000 17533 4000 56 25 26 7
Total 61 1360 200 5312 600 53 12 19 4
* Nominal values in 1000 EUR. Average and median debt are reported only for the firms with
debt. Debt-to-assets, and debt-to-annual turnover ratios are multiplied by 100.
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3 Revenue and costs during the pandemic
The previous section gave an overview of the structure and performance of the SME
sector just prior to the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this section, we
examine the impact on firms across a range of indicators of performance – turnover,
profitability and employment – and we also examine the extent to which firms were
able to adjust their expenditures as business activity fell.
3.1 The impact on turnover and profitability
Beginning with turnover, Table 4 shows the extent of the falls in turnover across
broad sectors and size groups. This compares the period between mid-March and
October 2020 to the level of activity in 2019. The table shows changes for the mean
of each sector and size group and at a number of other points in the distribution
(first quartile, median and third quartile). These measures show fairly considerable
variation in several cases, demonstrating that the pandemic did not affect firms
across or within groups evenly. The bottom row of the table gives the overall extent
of the effect of the pandemic on the SME sector, showing a mean fall in turnover
of over 26 per cent. The median is just very slightly below this for the SME sector
as a whole, showing a decline in activity of one-quarter relative to the previous
year. Many firms faced more severe falls in turnover than this average indicates,
with turnover halving for firms at the 25th percentile. At the other end of the
distribution, no change in output was faced by firms at the 75th percentile and the
more detailed graphs in Figure 2 show a certain, albeit relatively small, group of
firms increased turnover in this period.
Across sectors, the pandemic and resulting public health restrictions had a par-
ticularly severe impact on the hotels and restaurants sector, where median turnover
fell by 65 per cent and firms at the 25th percentile encountered declines of 80 per
cent relative to previous activity. This was also the only sector where substantial
declines in turnover are found even at the upper end of the distribution. Across
other sectors, the wholesale trade sector and business services were amongst the
least impacted, although the median reduction in output is still substantial.
The variation in impact across size groups is slightly less stark than across sectors.
We find that the self-employed are much more affected than the other size classes
with median falls in turnover of 35 per cent compared to the overall impact of 25
per cent across the SME sector as a whole. The scale of the reduction in turnover
of 70 per cent towards the most affected end of the distribution (25th percentile) is
also considerably greater amongst the self-employed than was encountered for other
size classes. Apart from the self-employed the scale of the reductions in turnover
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is broadly similar for each of the other size classes. More detail on the extent of
variation within the broad groups is shown in Figure 2 which shows boxplots for
each sector and size group, indicating the spread of the turnover shock and also how
this compares to changes in expenditure (discussed further later in this section).
Table 4: Change in turnover between mid-March and October 2020 compared to
2019
Freq. Mean Q1 Med. Q3
Manufacturing 181 -20.4 -40 -20 0
Construction 134 -25.3 -40 -30 0
Wholesale 466 -19.6 -40 -25 0
Hotels & restaurants 167 -60.8 -80 -65 -40
Business services 333 -25.0 -40 -25 0
Other 211 -22.9 -35 -15 0
Self-employed 155 -33.9 -70 -35 0
Micro 424 -25.9 -50 -25 0
Small 567 -25.0 -40 -27 0
Medium 346 -26.6 -40 -20 0
Total 1492 -26.5 -50 -25 0
In terms of other firms characteristics that may lead to differential exposure
to the effects of the pandemic on turnover, we can also look at exporting status
and location in counties with longer restriction periods in August. (O’Toole, 2020)
showed that there were considerable differences between domestically-orientated ser-
vices sectors and the export-orientated multinational sectors, particularly pharma-
ceuticals and medical devices, with the latter increasing rather than decreasing ac-
tivity during 2020. Figure 1 shows that this stark difference in performance be-
tween multinational-dominated sectors and other sectors is not strongly reflected
in differences between exporting and non-exporting SMEs. The particular sectoral
concentration in pharmaceuticals and medical devices appears therefore to be the
key factor driving the difference rather than export status. Figure 1 also shows the
difference in turnover impacts for Dublin and for Laois, Offaly and Kildare relative
to other counties as restrictions remained in place longer in these areas. The im-
pact is limited, probably due to the much greater impact of the initial country-wide
restrictions.
Such a substantial reduction in turnover would of course be expected to also be
reflected in profit margins. The two would not necessarily be completely correlated
however as the extent of the impact on profitability will depend on whether and
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Figure 1: Differences in turnover shock by exporter status and county
detail below. Firstly however, we examine the size of profits or losses made by firms
in the period from mid-March to October 2020 and how these compare to profits in
the previous year. Table 5 shows that for firms in the SME sector as a whole, there
were average losses of 9 per cent following the onset of the pandemic. This compares
to an estimated mean profit margin of 24 per cent in 2019. The variation in the
size of the losses in the second and third quarters of 2020 is fairly considerable,
both between and within sectors. As with turnover, the experience of the hotels
and restaurants sector is once again the most negatively impacted, with mean profit
margins of -35 percentage points and a median of -30 per cent. Across most other
sectors, the median profit margin was zero compared to a median of 15 per cent in
2019. At the upper end of the profit margin distribution (75th percentile), margins
remained positive in many sectors but at a substantially reduced level relative to the
highest margin firms in the previous year. Across size categories, the self-employed
again appear to have been the hardest hit with mean losses of 20 per cent compared
to the overall mean of 9 per cent. They were also the only group where even the
top percentile had a zero profit margin.
The changes in turnover and extent of losses across all sectors and size groups
show the magnitude of the COVID-19 shock on the SME sector of the economy.
Next, we examine if there is any pattern to suggest that the most affected firms
were those that were already in financial difficulty. If the effects of the pandemic
were largely concentrated in firms that were struggling to be profitable in the growing
economic environment prior to the pandemic, that might affect how support policies
would be formulated or influence how they should be targeted. In particular, policy
questions around long-term viability, which will be a key determinant in whether
financially distressed companies are more likely to be liquidated or restructured, are
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Table 5: Profit margin in 2019, and between mid-March and October 2020
Profit margin 2019 Profit margin 2020
Freq. Mean Q1 Med. Q3 Freq. Mean Q1 Med. Q3
Manufacturing 164 21.1 0 11 50 169 -3.3 -10 0 10
Construction 127 20.8 1 17 38 126 -7.2 -14 0 0
Wholesale 432 26.1 2 15 50 420 -5.9 -15 0 8
Hotels & restaurants 150 29.1 0 20 53 147 -34.9 -70 -30 0
Business services 311 30.5 4 20 59 308 -4.3 -5 0 5
Other 198 11.4 0 6 33 187 -8.9 -10 0 5
Self-employed 148 29.6 5 33 60 142 -19.8 -50 0 0
Micro 398 25.4 0 20 50 378 -7.5 -20 0 3
Small 518 21.3 0 12 47 523 -7.0 -15 0 5
Medium 318 24.8 0 9 50 315 -8.7 -20 0 7
Total 1381 24.2 0 15 50 1358 -8.9 -20 0 5
likely to take into account a combination of pre-pandemic profitability, in-pandemic
performance, and sectoral and firm-specific outlook based in changes to demand.
By correlating the broad performance of firms in 2019 with that of 2020, we find
that the impact of the pandemic was so wide-spread that there is no evidence of a
strong and direct link between firm profitability in 2019 and how they fared in 2020.
Table 6 shows the profitability cross-tabulation of the two years, showing whether
firms made a profit, loss or broke even in 2019 and the category they moved into in
2020. Note that the survey did not directly ask about 2019 profits: The profitability
categories in 2020 are directly from the data, and profitability in 2019 is calculated
from the information collected on expenditures and turnover. Cross-checking of
these profitability group estimates show that the aggregated numbers are closely
comparable to data collected from 2019 survey.
In 2019, almost 65 per cent of SMEs made a profit, 28 per cent broke even and
7 per cent made a loss. In 2020, the impact of the pandemic resulted in 36 per cent
making a loss and the share of firms making a profit fell to just under one-third. Of
the firms that made a loss or broken even in 2020, the majority had made a profit
in 2019. The share of firms making a loss in both years was just over 3 per cent.
Despite the extent of the economic downturn associated with COVID-19, some of the
firms that made a loss in 2019 returned to profitability in 2020. Overall, this cross-
tabulation demonstrates the broad impact of the pandemic on business activity and
an almost complete lack of correlation between prior performance and profitability
during this period. In particular, the results here suggest that 2020 performance
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Figure 2: Distribution of turnover and expenditure shocks by firm size and sector
Boxplots exclude outside values.
struggling in 2020 having a history of pre-pandemic profitability. Combining these
trends with sector- and firm-specific outlook, there will be much complexity involved
in arriving at decisions around the appropriate tapering of financial supports, bank
lending decisions, and restructuring and insolvency decisions.
Table 6: Profitability cross-tabulation
Profitability in 2020
Profitability in 2019 Loss Broke even Profit Total
Made a loss 3.2 2.2 1.9 7.3
Broke even 10.2 9.0 9.7 28.3
Made a profit 22.8 19.8 21.9 64.4
Total 36.1 30.9 33.0 100.0
The results so far show that almost three-quarters of SMEs experienced declines
in turnover between March and October 2020 and that over one-third made losses
while a further 31 per cent had profit margins of zero. In Table 7, we examine
in more detail the correlation between the extent of the turnover shock and profit
margins. Of the 36.5 per cent of firms that made a loss, almost all had experienced
substantial falls in turnover of at least 25 per cent. A substantial minority (10.4
per cent of all firms, equivalent to 28 per cent of those making losses) had turnover
declines in excess of 75 per cent. Firms that broke even also mainly experienced
losses but of lesser magnitude with the largest group having losses in the range of
25 to 50 per cent. Firms that made profits in this period experienced either small
decreases or saw turnover increase. A small fraction of firms however continued
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to make profits despite large reductions in turnover, suggesting high starting profit
margins in these small number of instances.
Table 7: Changes in turnover and profit margin cross-tabulation
Profitability in 2020
Change in turnover Loss Broke even Profit Total
V. large decrease 10.4 1.3 0.5 12.2
Large decrease 8.9 3.3 1.0 13.2
Medium decrease 11.8 12.0 5.7 29.5
Small decrease 2.9 5.4 7.1 15.4
Remained 1.6 7.6 8.3 17.5
Increase 0.8 1.5 9.9 12.3
Total 36.5 31.1 32.5 100.0
A very large decrease is defined as 75% or more, large between 75% up to
including 50%, medium between 50% up to including 25%, and a small decrease
is less than 25%.
3.2 How has expenditure reacted?
The substantial reductions in turnover could be considered the most direct impact
on businesses due to pandemic and the associated public health measures put in
place to limit its spread. To understand the total effect on firm finances, we also
need to assess the extent to which they were able to reduce expenditure as turnover
contracted. Previous work on the impact of the pandemic on SMEs, such as Lawless
et al. (2020a) and Lambert et al. (2020), had limited information on the level and
composition of expenditure and gathering more detailed information on expenditure
adjustments was one of the central objectives of the most recent wave of the CDS
data. In this section, we document how overall expenditure developed in 2020 and
how this related to the severity of turnover reductions. For the group of firms that
reduced expenditure, we further examine the composition of the reductions across
a range of expenditure categories.
The mean reduction in expenditure across all firms shown in Table 8 was 8.5
per cent while the median was no change in overall expenditure. This compares to
the overall turnover reduction of approximate one-quarter shown in Table 4. Across
sectors, hotels and restaurants had the most substantial reductions in expenditure
with a mean reduction of just over 18 per cent and a 40 per cent reduction at the
25th percentile. Across size groups, the largest mean decline was amongst the self-
employed with the other three categories being broadly similar in terms of average
reductions. Increases in expenditure are rare for the self-employed but somewhat
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more commonly incurred in the larger size groups. Comparing the expenditure
distribution by sector and firms size to that of turnover in Figure 2, the most striking
features are the smaller median reductions and the much narrower spread of the
distributions of expenditure reductions across all groups.
To examine slightly more formally the correlation between turnover and expen-
diture changes, the right-hand panel of Table 8 shows the estimated relationship
between expenditure and turnover for each sector and size group, modelled as:
∆Expenditurei = β0 + β1 · ∆Turnoveri + εi (1)
The estimates for the full sample in the bottom row of the table corresponds to
the fitted line in Figure 3. Overall, we find a statistically significant coefficient of
0.366. This indicates that for every one per cent fall in turnover, we would expect
to see a 0.366 per cent fall in expenditure, although no direct causation can be
inferred from this estimation. There is considerable variation across sectors and size
groups beneath this overall coefficient with stronger relationships (over 0.5) found
in manufacturing and the hotels and restaurants sector. Across size groups, there is
almost no variation in the magnitude of the relationship between turnover change
and expenditure change.
Table 8: Change in expenditure
Change in expenditure Expenditure elasticity
Freq. Mean Q1 Med. Q3 Constant Slope
Manufacturing 179 -8.7 -20 0 1 3.929** 0.560***
Construction 130 -8.6 -20 0 0 0.892 0.351***
Wholesale 452 -6.2 -10 0 0 0.104 0.326***
Hotels & restaurants 159 -18.4 -40 -10 5 13.766*** 0.512***
Business services 323 -11.1 -20 0 0 0.598 0.419***
Other 205 -1.6 -3 0 5 3.850** 0.198***
Self-employed 153 -13.2 -20 0 0 −2.022 0.370***
Micro 408 -8.3 -15 0 0 1.809 0.360***
Small 552 -7.5 -15 0 4 3.530*** 0.357***
Medium 335 -8.3 -15 0 0 2.004 0.355***
Total 1448 -8.5 -15 0 0 2.173*** 0.366***
Slope coefficients, β1 from equation 1, are expenditure elasticity of turnover. Significance levels
(*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1) estimated using robust standard errors. Regressions exclude outliers
with changes greater than 100%.
Table 9 shows the link between changes in expenditures and changes in turnover
in a different format, calculating the share of firms in each of the cells representing
a turnover change category and an expenditure change category. Looking first at
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the total column for changes in turnover, we find that just over 70 per cent of
firms experienced a decline in turnover. Almost 12 per cent of firms experience
falls of more than 12 per cent. A further 17 per cent had no change and just
under 12 per cent had a turnover increase. In terms of expenditure, fewer firms
(39 per cent over the four subcategories of decline) had a decrease of some amount
in expenditure, 37 per cent had unchanged expenditures and almost one quarter
increased spending. While this shows the pattern of correlation between changes
in turnover and expenditure, it is striking that a fairly substantial group (over 13
per cent) faced a combination of decreased turnover but higher expenditure. This
is also evident in the number of dots in the upper-left quadrant of the scatterplot of
changes of turnover and expenditure changes in Figure 3.
Table 9: Change in expenditures and changes in turnover cross-tabulation
Change in expenditures
Change in turnover VL. dec. L. dec. M. dec. S. dec. Rem. Incr. Total
V. large decrease 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.6 2.5 1.0 11.8
Large decrease 0.4 2.2 2.5 1.8 3.4 2.9 13.1
Med. decrease 0.1 0.6 4.7 8.3 10.2 6.1 30.0
Small decrease 0.0 0.5 0.5 4.8 6.5 3.4 15.7
Remained 0.2 0.1 0.6 2.4 9.7 4.5 17.4
Increase 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 4.7 6.5 12.0
Total 2.9 5.8 10.6 19.5 37.0 24.3 100.0
In order to understand how firms were adjusting their expenditures as part of the
adjustment to the severe shock to turnover that most firms encountered, the survey
asked those firms that had reported decreased expenditure overall for a breakdown
of where they had made reductions in costs.9 Table 10 therefore represents a subset
of the total sample, approximately one-third of firms.10
The first column of the table gives the number of firms responding that their
expenditure on the relevant item had fallen and the second column expresses the
same information as a percentage of firms that had reduced overall expenditure.
This indicates that when firms reduced overall expenditure, the most common item
that declined was purchased inputs of goods and services, which were reduced by
almost 70 per cent of firms. Reductions in wages were the next most common area
of expenditure savings, with 65 per cent of firms that reduced total expenditure
9The detailed breakdown of expenditure categories is not available for firms where total expen-
diture was unchanged or increased.
10This is slightly fewer than the 39 per cent indicating an expenditure fall due to some missing
observations in the expenditure composition question.
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Figure 3: Change in expenditures and change in turnover since the beginning of the
pandemic
reporting that this was one of the areas were costs declined. This makes sense as
both of these are variable costs and, as we saw in Table 1, they make up the vast
majority of expenditure for most SMEs so are therefore the most obvious areas to
seek reductions. At the same time, there is limited evidence of a correlation between
firms having high shares of fixed expenditures and the change in total spending as
shown in Figure 4.
Payments to the Revenue Commissioners, utility payments and commercial rates
were other areas where reductions were made by a relatively large share of the firms
reducing overall expenditure. The shares of firms reducing payments on rent or
debts is substantially lower as these are areas where not all firms have expenditure -
recall that in Table 1 rent represented an average of 3 per cent of SME expenditure
and debt repayments made up an average of 2 per cent. This also would be a factor
in how many areas firms sought expenditure reductions, with Figure 5 showing most
concentrated the decreases in their expenditure in either one or two areas.
While the focus of this section has been on reducing expenditures to cushion
some of the impact of turnover falls, the pandemic also potentially increased costs
for many firms in the form of necessary investments on complying with health and
safety measures. Table 11 shows that these new investments amounted to between
0.5 and 2.5 per cent of 2019 expenditures across firms. Larger shares were prominent
in firms that reported overall increases in expenditure although we do not have
enough detail to say if the health investments were the main driver of the overall
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Table 10: Change in expenditures
N∆Ei<0 Share∆Ei<0 Mean Q1 Med. Q3
Goods & services purchases 385 68.9 -46.7 -70 -40 -20
Wages, personal costs 363 64.8 -46.5 -70 -40 -20
Payments to Revenue 154 27.5 -39.9 -60 -30 -10
Utilities 153 27.4 -25.8 -40 -20 -10
Commercial rates 111 19.9 -51.8 -100 -50 -10
Rent 63 11.3 -39.4 -50 -25 -15
Interests and debt payments 55 9.9 -37.6 -80 -25 -10
Other expenditures 102 18.2 -56.6 -100 -50 -20
This table includes only 560 SMEs that had experienced decline in total expenditure and provided
data on changes in each item. Among this subset, 37% are rentees and 61% have some debt. Mean,
median and quartiles apply only to firms with decreases in the expenditure item.
increase. It is notable that even firms with large and very large overall decreases in
expenditures report outlays of up to 1 per cent of total 2019 expenditure levels on
this new outgoing.
Table 11: Average investments related to COVID-19 health & safety measures as a
share of 2019 expenditures
Change in expenditures
Change in turnover VL. dec. L. dec. M. dec. S. dec. Rem. Incr.
V. large decrease 1.0 0.5 1.6 0.5 0.7 .
Large decrease . 0.5 1.4 0.4 1.3 2.5
Med. decrease . . 0.8 0.9 1.4 2.5
Small decrease . . . 0.5 1.0 2.9
Remained . . . 0.4 0.7 1.1
Increase . . . . 1.1 0.6
. = Insufficient data (fewer than observation)
3.3 Changes in employment
The unprecedented scale of the impact of the pandemic on employment has been the
key focus in terms of the targeting of the policy response with the launch of inter-
ventions such as the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) and the Temporary
Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS). Policy interventions will be discussed further in the
next section, while this section looks specifically at how employment has changed
within the SME sector and its relationship between the other main indicators of
the severity of the impact of the pandemic on firms, turnover and profitability. We
discussed earlier in the section the extent of turnover declines amongst SMEs during
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Figure 4: Relationship between change in expenditures and share of fixed costs
reported reductions in activity. Table 12 shows how the broad categories of changes
in turnover overlap with changes in firm employment.
Overall, 28 per cent of SMEs reported reductions in both turnover and staff.
However, it is not the case that falls in turnover automatically result in employment
reductions. Of the 70 per cent experiencing turnover decreases, the largest share
(representing 38.5 per cent of all firms) kept their staff numbers unchanged. A
small number of firms (4 per cent) reported increases in employment despite falls in
turnover – perhaps due to increased obligations on social distancing. The magnitude
of the impact of the pandemic on SME activity is also reflected in the very small share
of firms (4 per cent) where both turnover and employment increased. This is shown
in more detail in Figure 6 which shows the shares of firms changing employment at
each point along the turnover change continuum.
Figure 7 presents the same exercise comparing employment changes at each
level of profit margin. This shows decreases in employment more common for firms
making losses but some staff reductions and a majority share of unchanged staffing
for firms even with relatively high profit margins. The total shares of firms in each
of the categories of staff change and profit group are shown in Table 13 which finds
that slightly over 7 per cent of firms reduced staff levels despite making a profit.
Another expenditure item that can be used as an indicator of financial distress
is the missing of payments. Table 14 shows that slightly over ten per cent of SMEs
report that they have encountered delays in the payment of invoices by their cus-
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Figure 5: Count of expenditure decrease items
Table 12: Employment and change in turnover cross-tabulation
Change in staff in 2020
Change in turnover Decreased Same level Increased Total
V. large decrease 6.6 5.0 0.3 11.8
Large decrease 6.5 6.4 0.2 13.1
Medium decrease 10.9 16.4 2.7 30.0
Small decrease 4.1 10.7 0.9 15.7
Remained 2.9 13.2 1.3 17.4
Increase 1.0 6.9 4.1 12.0
Total 31.9 58.6 9.5 100.0
The most common missed or deferred payment was on taxes, which was reported by
21 per cent of firms. This is likely linked to the use of tax warehousing as a policy
intervention to support SMEs which will be discussed further in the next section.
Repayments on loans from banks and other institutions were also missed by a rel-
atively substantial portion of businesses. 12 per cent of all sampled SMEs report
deferring a bank loan payment, which, when combined with the fact that around
half of sampled SMEs have bank debt, is broadly in line with previous Central Bank
reporting that 28 per cent of SME debt was subject to a payment break in June
2020.
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Table 13: Employment and profitability cross-tabulation
Change in staff in 2020
Profitability Decreased Same level Increased Total
Made a loss 16.8 17.4 2.7 36.5
Broke even 8.0 21.4 1.6 31.1
Made a profit 7.2 19.4 5.9 32.5
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Figure 6: Change in number of staff
Blue=fraction of firms that have increased employment, grey= the same staff, red=have reduced
staff as a function of change in turnover. Estimated using kernel-weighted local polynomial
smoothing. Dots below the x-axis represent where firms are located in terms of change in
turnover. Note that firms with firms with a large increases in turnover are not included, because
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Figure 7: Change in number of staff
Blue=fraction of firms that have increased employment, grey= the same staff, red=have reduced
staff as a function of profit margin. Estimated using kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing.
Dots below the x-axis represent where firms are located in terms of change in turnover. Note that
the low number of observations with high profit margins reduce reliability of estimates upper end
of the distribution.
Table 14: Invoices unpaid to the SMEs and payments deferred by the SMEs
Unpaid invoices Share of firms that have missed or deferred
Share Percent Bank O. loan Person. Tax Mortg. Rent Suppl.
Manufacturing 47 7.4 8 6 5 21 5 6 7
Construction 59 13.0 5 7 2 14 3 4 7
Wholesale 50 10.6 12 6 2 19 3 8 5
Hotels & restaurants 30 6.8 37 17 12 40 16 16 25
Business services 59 15.5 7 3 1 22 4 4 5
Other 36 6.8 11 5 1 14 2 4 3
Self-employed 43 10.9 7 2 2 7 5 5 3
Micro 47 11.4 8 5 2 18 6 7 5
Small 50 10.6 14 7 3 25 4 7 9
Medium 51 9.4 18 10 4 26 5 7 10
Total 48 10.6 12 7 3 21 5 7 7
Percent=percentage of pre-March invoices still owed in October 2020, O. loan=other (non-bank)
business loans, Suppl.=payments to suppliers.
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4 The Policy Response
The very specific nature of the economic shock, which effectively turned off demand
instantaneously for many firms, required the deployment of a non-traditional suite of
policies. Internationally, recent research by the World Bank has shown that a total of
1,607 policies have been introduced across 135 countries (Cirera et al., 2020). They
note that 75 per cent of these policies are either debt instruments, employment cost
support or tax measures. In Ireland, the policy response has indeed clustered in these
areas with measures to date including wage subsidisation, tax, loan and commercial
rate payment deferrals and fixed cost recovery schemes. This was complemented by
an expansion of more standard lending support.
In this section, we draw on our new survey evidence to explore the awareness and
usage of selected supports across different groups of SMEs. We also review some of
the other more recent supports which were only brought in after the survey went
into the field but are important in terms of the ongoing response to the COVID-19
pandemic.
4.1 The usage and availability of policy supports: Survey evidence
A crucial economic and societal policy aim was to minimise the labour market fallout
and attempt to keep employees and businesses connected through any disruption.
To address these aims, one of the earliest policy initiatives at the enterprise level
was the introduction of a Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) which provided
those employers, who had faced a fall in turnover of greater than 25 per cent, with a
payment to offset their wage cost if they agreed to keep the employee. The payment
was initially set as 70 per cent of pre-pandemic wage levels per employee up to a
maximum of e410 per person. This was changed on 4th of May 2020 to have a more
graduated payment structure.11 The TWSS continued to operate up until the 30th
of August 2020 when it was replaced by the Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme
(EWSS), which attempted to put the policy on a more longer term basis. In terms
of the efficacy of this policy measure, our data in table 10 shows that on average
35 per cent of SMEs costs were from wages. Therefore providing support to cover
wage costs not only helps to maintain links between employees and employers but it
also addresses one of the key cost items of a firms operational activities. The use of
wage cost support/wage subsidies was very prevalent internationally (Cirera et al.,
2020).
11A full detailing of the scope of the TWSS is outside the scope of this short policy overview.
Please see www.citizensinformation.ie/en for more details.
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Table 15 outlines the percentage of enterprises either aware of, or that used,
the TWSS. While nearly all firms (across sector and size classes) were aware of the
TWSS, the usage overall was approximately 60 per cent or three in every five firms.
Usage of the TWSS was highest in the hotels and restaurants and constructions
sectors’ which reflects the fact that these sectors were disproportionately affected
by the economic impact of the shocks; over 85 per cent of hotels and restaurants
used the TWSS while 70 per cent of construction SMEs used the scheme. Usage
was lower amongst manufacturing and wholesale firms. The correlation between the
turnover shock faced by the sector and its average usage of TWSS is presented in
figure 10. It is clear the TWSS has been used more extensively by firms in the worst
affected sectors. Indeed, if we consider the correlation between turnover shocks and
TWSS usage, over 70 per cent of firms experiencing a turnover shock of over 25
per cent used the TWSS. It is noteworthy that there are a non-trivial share of those
enterprises who have reported an increase in turnover relative to 2019 have availed of
the TWSS (one-in-five). It must be noted that while TWSS eligibility was based on
a revenue fall of 30% relative to pre-pandemic revenues at the point of application,
our results are for average revenue declines across the March to September period,
which explains why some companies using the TWSS are reported as having revenue
declines of less than 30% (their turnover may have fallen, they correctly entered the
scheme, and then their turnover recovered during reopening phase).
There are notable differences across firm size in the take up of the TWSS with
micro enterprises and self-employed firms using the scheme much less than other size
groups. However, figure 8 shows that the usage rates by the number of employees
are very non-linear with a rapid increase in usage between 2 and 10 employees and
a gradual decline then as size increases to 250.
In addition to the TWSS, a number of cash flow measures were introduced early
in the pandemic to support SMEs. One such policy was the provision of a warehous-
ing facility for tax liabilities (VAT and PAYE tax liabilities) which incorporated the
postponement of interest collection on late payments. Our figures for expenditure
in table 1 show that on average 6 per cent of firms’ costs were from taxes. While 60
per cent of firms were aware of this facility, only 20 per cent of enterprises report
using tax warehousing. There are considerable differences across size and sector.
The sectoral differences, like the TWSS, reflect the impacts on firms with the more
affected sectors like hotels and restaurants reporting higher usage of tax warehous-
ing (nearly 50 per cent). Across the firm size distribution, the usage of the policy
was increasing in the number of employees: while one-in-three medium size firms
used tax warehousing, only one-in-ten micro firms and fewer than one-in-twenty
self-employed businesses did. Indeed, figure 8 shows that the use of tax warehousing
appears to linearly increase with the number of employees.
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One final aspect of the policy response which is covered in our survey is the usage
of lending initiatives from the Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland (SBCI). The
SBCI acts as the state lending institution regarding the COVID lending supports
(working as an onlender through bank and non-bank providers). This includes the
COVID-19 Working Capital Scheme (loans from €25,000 up to €1.5 million (first
€500,000 unsecured) with a maximum interest rate of 4 per cent) and the COVID-
19 credit guarantee scheme which provides a total of e2bn worth of guarantees on
secured and unsecured loans. Nearly one-in-two firms were aware of the SBCI but
fewer than 6 per cent of firms actually used an SBCI-related product. This varied
by sector with nearly 10 per cent in manufacturing and hotels and restaurants down
to below 4 percent in business services. Notable differences were also evident across
the size distribution of firms with few small firms drawing on these lending facilities.
This final point is not necessarily an indication of a gap in the policy suite of
measures as smaller loans for micro enterprises are facilitated through Micro-finance
Ireland who introduced a similar COVID-19 specific loan of up to 25,000 with a six
month payment and interest break period to begin with. We do not have data in
our survey on these loans. One limitation of our analysis in this regard is that the
SBCI has also non-COVID related facilities available and unfortunately we are not
able to disentangle these activities. Given that just under 50 per cent of firms were
aware of the SBCI initiatives, increased communications of the supports may be
required, especially for small firms who wouldn’t necessarily draw on Microfinance
Ireland lending.
In terms of the general targeting of loan supports, a couple of reflections are
worth making at this juncture. First, it does appear that despite the shock, demand
for state lending facilities is low. This is not unsurprising if firms do not want to take
on extra leverage at a time when demand is dropping. Therefore it is appropriate to
have loan supports in place but more important are the bespoke instruments that
address the cost side for firms. Second, and related to this, is that the use of debt
instruments is not necessarily the correct policy measure if we are hoping that firms
will have a chance to survive post the pandemic. Indeed, research from Japan on the
expansion of credit guarantees after COVID-19 (Yamori & Aizawa, 2020) suggests
that despite the rapid increase in guarantees, many of the firms that borrowed under
guarantee may struggle to repay these debts. A harsh lesson from the previous
financial crisis is that debt overhang causes a drag on many firm activities (such as
investment, employment and outright survival), therefore the targeting of policies
towards cost coverage or grants is certainly more appropriate at this stage.
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Table 15: Share of firms aware about possible support policies and their uptake
Awareness Uptake
TWSS Tax w. SBCI Other None TWSS Tax w. SBCI None
Manufacturing 95.5 65.8 51.2 95.7 2.3 58.7 14.6 9.8 37.6
Construction 90.6 48.3 34.5 94.0 3.3 70.4 13.4 5.3 28.8
Wholesale 91.8 53.6 41.1 95.1 2.9 55.8 15.7 5.1 42.3
Hotels & restaurants 94.4 74.3 50.7 91.4 3.9 85.9 48.4 9.4 12.2
Business services 96.5 66.3 49.4 96.8 1.1 61.1 20.7 3.6 35.9
Other 95.0 59.0 52.3 97.1 1.8 49.1 12.8 3.8 44.4
Self-employed 85.7 38.5 23.9 94.6 3.6 27.3 3.7 1.8 71.0
Micro 90.3 49.3 40.0 93.5 4.2 53.3 11.1 4.3 43.7
Small 95.9 65.5 48.5 95.3 1.6 72.5 21.6 5.8 25.6
Medium 98.9 76.0 60.4 97.8 1.1 67.0 34.4 8.8 28.0
V. large decrease 92.3 56.8 40.2 90.9 5.5 67.1 26.3 5.9 31.4
Large decrease 92.5 61.5 43.9 94.4 2.5 71.9 29.1 8.4 25.6
Medium decrease 98.1 62.8 48.2 96.9 1.0 86.6 24.7 8.3 12.1
Small decrease 95.1 67.2 51.3 97.8 0.7 50.3 13.8 2.7 45.5
Remained 89.9 58.0 42.4 95.5 2.7 41.4 15.3 3.0 52.6
Increase 90.8 52.1 48.7 93.0 4.7 22.0 4.7 3.6 75.5
Total 93.9 60.5 46.2 95.3 2.4 61.0 19.7 5.7 36.1
TWSS=Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme, Tax w. =Tax warehousing option, and SBCI=Strategic
Banking Corporation of Ireland.
Awareness of other includes: Supporting SMEs Online Tool, Credit Guarantee Scheme, Micro-
finance Loan Fund, Enterprise Ireland, Local Enterprise Offices, Credit Review Office, payment
breaks, non-bank finance, or other support.
Uptake of the SBCI support includes firms that applied before the pandemic. Avail of none of the
policy refers only to the none of three listed policy (TWSS, tax warehousing or SBCI).
4.2 Other notable policy instruments
As the pandemic has progressed, further public health motivated business closures
were required from September 2020 onwards. The government established a 5 level
plan of varying levels of restrictions which could be introduced depending on the
epidemiological situation. In line with this time varying public health plan, the
Government moved to expand the range of supports available. Of particular note
was the Covid Restrictions Support Scheme (CRSS) which provided direct payments
of up to e5,000 per week to businesses forced to close due to mandated public
health restrictions. However, turnover must have fallen by 75 per cent to qualify.
Under the scheme, businesses operating in sectors asked to close are provided an
Advance Credit for Trading Expenses from Revenue up to the eligible amount. This
payment is a critical part of the policy infrastructure as it has the flexibility to be
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Figure 8: Support policies uptake by firm size
The relationship estimated nonparametrically using kernel-weighted local poly-
nomial smoothing.
varying nature of the payment is critical to ensuring that businesses are provided
with compensation for having to close. Keeping a mechanism like this in place should
be considered until such time as it will be possible to permanently withdraw more
stringent public health measures (such as when wide-scale vaccination is achieved).
Our analysis (as in figure 11 and table 16) shows that, using 2019 data, approx-
imately 28 per cent of firms had expenditure below e5,000 per week and 76 per
cent of firms had fixed costs below this point per week. This suggests that these
firms can be provided with this opportunity to survive the current period using this
mechanism. However, the requirement for a 75 per cent decline in turnover may
be prohibitive for entry as we estimate only 11 per cent of firms experienced this
magnitude of decline up to September 2020.
In addition to the above supports, a number of other instruments were also
deployed. This includes a commercial rates waver provided to all firms for 2020 and
for specific sectors into 2021. While commercial rates made up only 2 per cent of
firms costs on average in 2021 (table 1), this is certainly a measure than can help
alleviate short term cash flow pressures. Furthermore, a number of grant supports
were provided to help redesign business towards COVID related products and to help
address the cost of COVID-related public health changes to the business.12 These
type of instruments are useful and can play a helpful role in ensuring businesses can
transition and adapt to the new environment.
12These include the Covid-19 Products Scheme, Covid-19 Business Financial Planning Grant,
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Figure 9: Support policies uptake by turnover shock
The relationship estimated nonparametrically using kernel-weighted local poly-
nomial smoothing. Changes in turnover of 50% and above are excluded because
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Figure 11: Average weekly fixed-costs and total expenditures in 2019
Shaded area represent firms with fixed and total expenditures below e5000 per week.
22% of the SMEs do not report any expenditures for items categorised as fixed costs. Those SMEs
are shown in the density peak on the left.
Table 16: Average weekly expenditures in 1000 EUR
Fixed-costs expenditure Total expenditures
Mean Q1 Med. Q3 ShE<5k Mean Q1 Med. Q3 ShE<5k
Manufacturing 5.8 0.1 2.3 7.2 71.8 99.9 14.4 28.8 144.2 13.1
Construction 4.3 0.0 0.7 2.9 80.8 60.7 5.8 17.3 67.3 23.0
Wholesale 5.7 0.1 1.0 4.3 76.5 75.8 2.3 14.4 86.5 32.2
Hotels & restaurants 5.9 0.0 2.0 6.7 70.2 42.4 5.7 16.3 67.3 24.4
Business services 3.0 0.1 0.6 2.3 82.4 40.7 1.9 9.6 28.8 35.7
Other 7.6 0.0 0.7 5.8 70.4 83.6 5.8 22.7 139.4 24.0
Self-employed 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 100.0 1.2 0.5 0.8 1.4 96.2
Micro 1.0 0.1 0.4 1.3 95.7 11.9 1.5 5.8 11.5 45.1
Small 5.3 0.1 1.7 5.1 74.7 67.4 14.2 26.9 67.3 8.1
Medium 12.6 0.2 6.3 14.4 43.9 164.9 57.7 144.2 250.0 7.5
Total 5.2 0.0 1.0 4.6 76.1 66.8 3.8 14.4 67.3 27.9
ShE<5k=Share of firms with expenditures under e5000.
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5 Conclusion
The COVID-19 shock has been particularly unique: it was rapid, severe and exoge-
nous to the past performance of the enterprises. This is markedly different from
the previous financial crisis where the pre-crisis leverage and indebtedness position
was highly correlated with the ex post performance. In the COVID-19 scenario,
effectively whole sectors of the economy were shut down to achieve public health
goals with very uncertain reopening paths, in particular during the initial wave. At
that stage, firms faced an immediate drop in turnover, a requirement to continue
covering many fixed costs, while also having to manage considerable uncertainty in
purchases of their intermediate goods. Our data show that 70 per cent of firms faced
turnover declines and many firms faced severe losses. Declines in expenditure have
not been able to compensate for the dramatic declines in demand.
To address this unique set of economic circumstances, the initial policy response
was mainly aimed at helping firms address their various cost items. This included a
range of breaks and forbearance on debt, tax and commercial rate payments as well
as subsidies for wage costs. The focus on non-debt supports is appropriate given the
nature of the shock and the aim to ensure indebtedness levels do not hinder recovery
which was a factor following the financial crisis (Lawless et al., 2015). Continuing
the policy supports is important as long as strict public health restrictions continue
to be required.
Nearly as difficult as the development of alleviation policies will be the tapering
and withdrawal of supports. Given the extensiveness of the response, it is likely that
we will not see major firm failures until such time as this occurs. Indeed, we have
not seen many firm insolvencies since the crisis in Ireland (McGeever et al., 2020b).
Internationally, Greenwood et al. (2020) note the high failure of small firms and the
ability of the legal system to deal with this will be a considerable challenge once
the public health phase of the crisis has abated. Decisions around how and when
to taper the extensive support can be informed by the information in this paper, as
well as ongoing assessment of SMEs’ capacity for revenue recovery as publich health
restrictions gradually ease from the time of writing.
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Appendix 1 Sample Overview and Data Discus-
sion
The survey underlying the credit demand report series is a telephone survey of
approximately 1,500 respondents conducted twice a year. The fieldwork was under-
taken by Behaviour & Attitudes, the market research firm. The survey is stratified
by firm size (using the EU SME classifications) and sector (using NACE codes).
The database for the overall sample is the Bill Moss SME database which contains
120,000 records. For the survey, approximately 20,000 SMEs are identified randomly
subject to the size and sector classifications. Some sectors are not covered such as
government firms, charities, churches, property speculation and property develop-
ment, and other non-SME financial intermediaries. A full overview of the sectoral
inclusions can be found in the main report on the survey (Fitzpatrick Associates,
2020). The sampling error overall is +/- 2.6 per cent on the main results at the
95 per cent level. For this particular wave, the interviews were undertaken over
the period August 25th 2020 to October 12th 2020. For the COVID-specific wave,
additional care was taken to ensure that the quotas by size and sector matched the
previous historical waves of the survey. The main concern was that the impact of the
pandemic may have caused a sample selection bias due to the closure of particular
enterprises or a survivorship bias. The implication of this would be that some firms,
that closed due to the economic or public health measures due to COVID-19, would
be unavailable for survey leading to structural differences in the answers or a bias
in the results which underestimates (or overestimates) the impact (if badly affected
firms are not surveyed).
Examination of the structure of firm age and turnover (not quota variables)
shows a good comparison historically. Some small differences in the age distribution
are evident. The fact that the survey was undertaken mainly in early Autumn means
that many firms were likely to be operating. Indeed CSO research for late August
suggest that 96 per cent of enterprises were operating in some capacity in that period
(CSO, 2020). However, public health measures were introduced in September 2020
and continued with regional variation until the introduction of the level 5 measures
in October. They survey had stopped at that time point so will be unaffected by
this. In conclusion, we do not envisage a major impact on our results of the business
opening activities overall but there may be some impacts at a sub-sector, regional
level. The survey was targeted at capturing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
specifically, it does not capture the impacts of other economic shocks such as Brexit
as these are outside the timeframe examined. It is possible firms’ pre COVID-19
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operations had been impacted by other factors such as Brexit but these are not
identifiable in our survey
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